This contribution empirically analyzes the individual determinants of tax rate preferences. For that purpose, we use representative survey data from the German General Social Survey, which offers information on attitudes toward progressive, proportional and regressive taxation. On the basis of theoretical considerations, we explore the factors which, beyond an individual's financial interest, should drive preferences for progressive taxation. Our empirical results confirm that the narrow redistributive self-interest does not offer the sole explanation of the heterogeneity in individual attitudes. Rather, we show that the choice of the favored tax rate is also driven by fairness considerations and beliefs on the role of effort for economic success.
INTRODUCTION
Highly progressive tax systems confront high-income individuals with substantial marginal tax rates. Thus, they entail disincentives for private economic activity and may hamper potential growth. Although the introduction of alternative tax systems might be a desirable part of a growth-enhancing fiscal strategy, a transition toward a less progressive tax schedule or even a flat tax is regularly confronted with opposition. Flat tax regimes have only been possible in very few countries. Obviously, tax progression seems to be a majority preference in many industrial countries.
While the economic effects of tax progression have received much attention (see Fuest and Huber, 2001 for a brief survey), a full understanding of its political popularity is still lacking. Basically, two alternative but not necessarily mutually exclusive explanations compete: narrow redistributive self-interest and fairness concerns.
The view that an individual's tax policy preferences are largely driven by the impact of redistributive taxation on the individual's own net income is firmly rooted in political-economic theories. These approaches postulate that individuals choose their preferred tax rate based on a narrow financial self-interest calculus (Hettich and Winer, 1997) . Thus, increasing income redistribution should be supported by persons who benefit financially (net recipients), and opposed by those who are net payers to the welfare state (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) . From that perspective, tax progression is popular simply because its distributive costs are imposed on a minority of voters.
The fairness view is supported by the behavioral literature which stresses the role of other regarding preferences, reciprocity and fairness considerations in individual optimization calculus (such as Fehr and G€ achter, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) . Over the last decades, this literature has widened the understanding of 'self-interest' far beyond an individual's narrow financial advantage. Moreover, it has been empirically shown that fairness motives are likely to affect individual decision making (Konow, 2003) and preferences (Heinemann et al., 2009 ) with respect to labor market policy, for example. Independently from the impact of progressive taxation on their individual net income, people might support it just because they consider it to be more equitable than a flat tax schedule.
This study wants to widen the understanding for the relative merits of both explanations. The basic analytical idea originates from the fact that both explanations should differ in their empirical outcomes with respect to one key property. If the narrow redistributive self-interest view offers the sole relevant explanation, the support or rejection of tax progression should largely be driven by proxies which indicate a winner/loser position vis-a-vis progressive taxes. If, however, fairness considerations are also relevant, even losers from tax progression may be among its supporters. Thus, this contribution fills an important gap in our understanding of preferences for redistributive taxation. Here, it is of substantial policy relevance, since the knowledge of the determinants of individual tax preferences is crucial when it comes to an assessment of the political feasibility of tax reform proposals.
This contribution relates to the literature on individual preferences for income redistribution (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2009 for a survey). However, we do not focus on redistributive preferences, in general, but more specifically on attitudes toward progressive taxation. The existing empirical literature indicates that selfinterest may not be the only impact factor of individual attitudes on redistributive taxation. Although Hite and Roberts (1991) find that self-interest is partly reflected in taxpayers' assessment of vertical equity of income tax, Wilensky (1976) shows that the perceived fairness of taxes depends mainly on subjective feelings rather than on their objective level or equity. Nevertheless, his results suggest a self-serving bias in taxpayers' perception as they assess their own (income) group as relatively deprived, while the position of other taxpayers is considered beneficial. Indicating the relevance of fairness aspects, Ackert et al. (2007) provide experimental evidence on the importance of inequality aversion for decisions on tax structures. Furthermore, Slemrod (2006) shows that US citizens are more likely to support a substantial tax reform if they judge the current system to be unfair.
Our results are based on data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS), which is designed to be representative for the German population. ALLBUS includes questions on the preferred tax structure and several fairness aspects as well as information on the respondents' socioeconomic characteristics. The findings indicate that individual tax attitudes do not only reflect the respondents' financial benefits from a certain tax structure, but are found to be driven by fairness considerations as well. Hence, we reject the view that the popularity of tax progression results simply from a right-skewed distribution of incomes (as suggested by Meltzer and Richard, 1981) and the fact that the winners of progression have a majority of votes. Although we control for the respondents' financial self-interest, fairness-related indicators contribute substantially to the explanation of individual variance in progression preferences.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: The second section offers some facts about the attitudes toward progressive taxation among German voters. The subsequent section is devoted to the identification of potential factors that explain why individuals differ in their preferences for progressive tax rates. The econometric results and several robustness tests are presented in section 4 and some concluding remarks are offered in section 5.
ATTITUDES TOWARD PROGRESSIVE TAXATION WITHIN THE GERMAN POPULATION
To analyze the individual determinants of voters' attitudes toward progressive taxation, we employ survey data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). 1 Besides valuable information on the respondents' assessment of different tax rate structures, ALLBUS also offers data on the participants' socioeconomic status as well as their economic and fairness beliefs, fairness preferences and judgments on the status quo distribution. This survey has been conducted biannually since 1980 and is designed to be representative for the German population. In this study, we focus on data collected in the year 2000, which also includes questions designed for the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). In the context of the ISSP survey Social Inequality III, the respondents were asked to answer the following question related to their tax preferences: 'Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share or a smaller share?' The participants could choose between the following answers: People with high incomes should pay 'a larger' or 'much larger share', 'the same share' or 'a smaller,' respectively, 'a much smaller share' of their incomes in taxes than people with lower incomes. While the first two alternatives relate to progressive tax rates, the latter correspond to a proportional and a regressive taxation respectively. 2 Figure 1 depicts the response pattern. It is remarkable that a clear majority of the German population (nearly 80%) seems to favor a progressive tax system. The share of the respondents' preferring a proportional tax rate is considerably lower (19%), while the number of individuals choosing a regressive tax can be neglected. The three bars on the right show the tax structure preferences for different income groups. 3
Following political-economic models, we would expect a strong link between a person's income and his preferences concerning taxation (Hettich and Winer, 1997) . Applied to the individual attitudes toward different tax rates, we expect people with high incomes to be less in favor of a progressive taxation than those with low incomes. Figure 1 , however, reveals a surprising uniformity of opinion across the different income groups. Even though the share of respondents choosing progressive taxation is in fact decreasing in income, the relationship seems to be rather weak. Although they are very likely to bear financial losses from a progressive tax rate, still, 77% of the participants belonging to the upper income quantile prefer such a tax scheme (compared to 86% of the respondents within the 25th percentile). 4 The majority of German voters seems to approve a tax system that draws more on high-income individuals than on low-income recipients. Table 1 offers information about the support for progressive taxation among the population in 22 high-and middle-income countries. The international comparison reveals that the high support for progressive taxation is not peculiar to the German population, but obviously the majority preference in many industrial countries. Since political decision making (e.g. reforms of the tax system) in representative democracies is strongly affected by public opinion, the knowledge of the Figure 1 Preferences on income tax share for high-income people 4. The weak link between income and tax preferences might also reflect the possibility that individuals belonging to the 75th percentile of the income distribution do not regard themselves as high-income recipients. If this is the case, the desire for progressive taxation may be motivated by self-interest: The people want others (the rich) to pay taxes. Furthermore, it might also be rational for high-income recipients to support tax progression as a social insurance against negative income shocks (Varian, 1980) . determinants of public attitudes toward tax systems is crucial when it comes to an assessment of the political feasibility of reform proposals. Although redistributive self-interest seems to correspond to these attitudes, the link is far from being as close as suggested by conventional political-economic theory. This raises the question of other relevant driving factors of individual attitudes toward tax structures beyond individual financial gains or losses. Since taxation is an instrument of the government to redistribute market incomes, it is reasonable to expect that fairness aspects play a major role in the formation of the corresponding attitudes.
POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TOWARD PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
As individual views on the design of the tax structure are likely to depend on very different factors, the aim of our empirical analysis is twofold. Apart from the identification of the factors related to individual attitudes toward progressive taxation, we want to derive insights into the relative impact of different groups Notes: Population-weighted share of respondents who prefer a progressive tax system with highincome people paying a (much) larger share of their income in taxes than people with lower incomes. Based on survey data from the ISSP module 'Social Inequality III' collected in 1999.
of driving factors. First, individual gains and losses from progressive taxation are supposed to be important as individuals are affected differently by a given tax design. Second, the level of information about taxation may differ. Furthermore, fairness considerations are likely to affect individual attitudes toward progressive taxation in several respects. Besides differences in distributive preferences, people may entertain diverging beliefs on the role of incentives and the causes of inequality. This can result in different conclusions about the efficiency and necessity of progressive taxation. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that individuals judge tax structures based on their views on the fairness of the existing income distribution. Thus, we express the probability that an individual i prefers a progressive tax (PROG i ) as a function of his narrow financial self-interest (FINSELF i ), fairness considerations (FAIR i ), level of information (INFO i ) as well as a set of socioeconomic characteristics (IND i ):
The preference for progressive taxation of individual i is captured by his answer to the survey question introduced in section 2. The binary variable (PROG i ) is equal to one if the respondent states that high-income recipients should pay a (much) larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, and equals zero if he prefers a proportional or regressive income tax. 5
Financial self-interest
Political-economic models assume that individual support for or resistance against income redistribution is driven mainly by a narrow self-interest which is preoccupied with the individual's own gains or losses. Meltzer and Richard (1981) show that the median voter will choose a positive tax rate as long as he earns less than the population average and, therefore, benefits financially from income redistribution. 6 Applied to the decision about the degree of tax progression, one would expect support from individuals who are net recipients from such a tax scheme. Since the tax liability is disproportionately higher for wealthy individuals than for those with low incomes, it is reasonable to assume that the former will be less likely to support a progressive tax scheme. 7 Financial self-interest has been proven relevant for the assessment of tax policies. Hite and Roberts (1991) find that individuals in higher income brackets are less content with the fairness of steeply progressive tax rates. Furthermore, the 5. To facilitate the interpretation of the subsequent empirical analysis, our main results are based on a probit estimation. Since the structure of the dependent variable is ordered, Table 3 contains information on the robustness of the results using an ordered probit approach. 6. In this model, voters also consider work disincentives due to redistribution and the resulting welfare loss. It is, however, questionable to what extent the disincentive effects of progressive taxation are considered in the formation of public opinion on this topic. Reed-Arthurs and Sheffrin (2010) find that the public does not take them into account when making judgments on progressive taxation and furthermore does not believe that this should be done. 7. Taxes do not only finance redistribution but also the provision of public goods. However, for the public good-related part of government budgets, low-income individuals will also support progression.
financial situation of individuals has been found to affect the perceived fairness of different taxes or tax systems (Slemrod, 2006) . Simple political-economic models are, however, not able to explain why individuals support redistributive policies (e.g. via progressive taxation), although they have to bear financial losses from it. One possible explanation still adhering to financial self-interest is offered by Benabou and Ok (2001) . Given the possibility of income mobility, it might be rational for the currently rich (poor) to support (oppose) redistribution if they expect to earn less (more) than the population average in the future. Another aspect of income mobility has been stressed by Piketty (1995) . Experienced social mobility is likely to form the beliefs concerning the relative importance of individual effort for economic success. Individuals who experienced upward mobility may stress the relevance of effort, whereas those facing a loss in social status may ascribe this to bad luck (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) .
To account both for static and dynamic (i.e. mobility-related) redistributive self-interest, we exploit information on the respondents' position in the income distribution based on their individual net income 8 and the evolution of their self-reported social status over time. ALLBUS contains data about the respondents' placement in the social stratum in the year the survey has been conducted as well as ten years before. On the basis of this information, we construct the variable SOCIAL MOBILITY. 9 This variable takes a negative value for individuals who experienced downward mobility and a positive value for those who experienced upward mobility. 10 The respondents' placement in the income distribution is measured by three dummy variables indicating whether the respondent has a LOW, INTERMEDIATE or HIGH INCOME (i.e. belongs to the bottom quantile, the middle range or the top quantile of the income distribution). We expect that the support for progressive taxation should be the highest among low-income recipients and the lowest among those with high incomes, while experienced upward mobility should further reduce preferences for this tax structure.
Information
The level of information has been found to influence the individual assessment of economic policy. Boeri et al. (2002) show that a better knowledge of the functioning and costs of unfunded pension systems relates to a higher 8. ALLBUS only offers information on monthly net incomes. Information about income before taxes and transfers would be more appropriate to assess the financial self-interest related to tax structures. Since we are using the position in the income distribution (i.e. belonging to the 25th, 25th to 75th or 75th percentile), the bias due to a change in an individual's income group after redistribution should be less severe compared to an analysis based on concrete amounts of income. In an earlier version of this study (comp. Heinemann and Hennighausen, 2010) , we have also used the respondents' social status to capture their self-interest and the results remain robust. Moreover, the robustness tests in section 4.2 entail additional regressions using information on both the income and structure of the respondents' households. 9. ALLBUS only offers information on the respondents' realized but not on their expected mobility.
Hence, the interpretation of the variable SOCIAL MOBILITY is limited to the consequences of mobility suggested by Piketty (1995), but cannot be extended to mobility expectations. 10. More information on this and other included variables is provided in Table A3 in the appendix. support for pension reforms. In the context of tax systems, the level of information is likely to be reflected in individual policy assessments. Slemrod (2006) argues that the observable preference of US citizens for a flat or sales tax at least partly mirrors misconceptions about the degree of tax progression of the current system. Furthermore, Sheffrin (1993) points out that tax policy concepts are rather complex and receive little attention in public debates. The general public's lack of knowledge about taxation (especially related to the concept of progression) is reflected in the fact that the framing of survey questions is likely to affect the respondents' answers (Roberts et al., 1994) . Confronted with abstract questions, the majority of the respondents seem to prefer a progressive system, which is not the case if the respondents are offered a concrete example (e.g. declaration of just tax payments for different income groups). Furthermore, the evaluation of tax structures depends on whether the tax payments of different income groups have been presented in rates or in absolute values.
Thus, we would expect that the individual level of information about the tax system should be relevant for the corresponding answer behavior. ALLBUS offers no direct information on the respondents' knowledge about taxation and different tax schemes. Nevertheless, an empirical analysis of individual attitudes toward progressive taxation should take the respondents' level of information into account (at least to minimize possibly biased results due to minor knowledge). For this purpose, we make use of two types of variables to proxy the respondents' degree of information about taxation: First, we control for the level of education, since Blinder and Krueger (2004) provide some evidence that higher educated individuals have a better knowledge about major economic policy issues. Hence, we introduce the dummy variables SECONDARY and UPPER SECONDARY EDUCATION as well as UNIVERSITY, which are equal to one for respondents with the corresponding degree. In addition, we employ the respondent's opinion on the IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS to his personal life. The perception that political decisions affect their own life and well-being should increase the incentive to be informed about major political topics. This relationship has also been stressed by Edlund (2003) who argues that the high relevance of fiscal policy for the Swedish population due to the welfare state generosity involves a stronger awareness of topics related to public finance. Although we would expect that a better information level reduces, ceteris paribus, biases and misunderstandings, we do not have any a priori knowledge about the direction of this bias.
Beliefs
The relevance of beliefs (e.g. concerning the underlying reasons of inequality) for welfare state preferences has been emphasized by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) . It has been shown empirically that beliefs matter for tax preferences. For members of parliament, beliefs on company mobility affect the preferred levels of corporate taxes (Heinemann and Janeba, 2011) . For voters, the impact of individual effort relative to exogenous factors (like birth or luck) can explain differences in welfare state preferences (Alesina et al., 2001; Fong, 2001) . The implicit assumption that everyone is responsible for his own economic situation and that inequality results from differences in individual effort should lead to a less favorable assessment of progressive taxation. The same is expected for individuals believing that incentives affect individual effort. The disincentives of increasing tax rates for private economic activity should be weighted more and, thus, lead to a more critical assessment of tax progression. The respondents' beliefs concerning the reasons for economic success are captured by the dummy variable EFFORT. This variable takes on the value one for participants stating that differences in social status reflect individual variations in effort. For the corresponding regression coefficient a negative sign is expected.
A further belief that may be relevant for tax preferences is related to the procedural fairness of the political system. Following the concept of procedural fairness, the perceived justice of a certain (policy) outcome depends on the underlying decision-making process. It has been shown that procedural fairness increases the acceptance of decisions with unfavorable outcomes (Sondak and Tyler, 2007) as well as the perceived fairness of social inequality (Bischoff et al., 2008) . The respondents' beliefs regarding the degree of procedural fairness of the German political system are measured by their assessment of the functioning of the democracy. The impact of the resulting dummy variable DEMOCRACY (equal to one for those claiming to be (fully) satisfied with the democracy as practiced in Germany; zero otherwise) is theoretically ambiguous. It is may be reasonable to assume that the effectiveness of the democratic system fosters the trust of voters in the usage of taxpayers' money. The belief in an appropriate use of public money might, however, increase the willingness to pay higher taxes for all voters and, hence, facilitate the acceptance of taxes in general. Nevertheless, a comprehensive empirical analysis of attitudes toward taxation should also control for the belief in procedural fairness of the decision-making process since tax rates are determined politically.
Fairness preferences and the assessment of the status quo distribution
The design of a tax system is a major part of redistributive policies in developed countries. Consequently, fairness preferences are likely to shape attitudes toward progressive taxation. The individually preferred income distribution is the benchmark to assess the existing distributive outcome. Thus, persons favoring a distribution that guarantees everyone the (financial) means necessary for a reasonable living (need principle) should diverge in their attitudes toward redistribution from those who prefer the equity principle, for example. For them, the optimizing calculus on the preferred tax system would assign a positive value to a more need-related redistribution independent from the financial consequences for themselves. The respective respondents' fairness preferences are indicated by their agreement with the statement that people should have a decent income even without achievement. For the dummy variable NEED a positive sign is expected: other things equal, individuals preferring a distribution according to the need principle should be more supportive of a progressive taxation than those without that kind of preference.
It seems reasonable to expect that individuals who perceive the existing distribution of incomes and wealth within their country as inadequate should be Attitudes Toward Progressive Taxation in favor of redistributive policies. On the other hand, the judgment of the existing inequality as fair should decrease the demand for redistribution. Hence, we expect that individuals assessing the existing SOCIAL DIFFERENCES as (completely) just as well as those who do not observe a worsening of the situation of ORDINARY PEOPLE are less likely to exhibit preferences for progressive taxes. Besides information on the respondents' assessment of the social justice, ALLBUS also includes a question related to the perceived justice of the own income situation and, therefore, allows to introduce a more egocentric view on the fairness of the income distribution. The participants were asked whether the income they receive is appropriate given their achievements. On the basis of this information, we construct the dummy variable ADEQUATE WAGE, which equals one for respondents stating to be (at least) adequately paid relative to their effort. It is hypothesized that the individuals' satisfaction with their own earnings is related to a lower demand for redistribution and therefore progressive taxation.
Individual characteristics
A number of personal characteristics are likely to go along with preferences for progressive taxation. Some of these characteristics capture specific aspects of the above-discussed aspects of financial self-interest, information, beliefs or fairness assessments that cannot be observed directly. In addition, however, personal characteristics account for new aspects.
Focusing on policy preferences of German citizens, it is necessary to account for the historical feature of the existence of the two former German regimes. The socialization under the communist regime of the former GDR has been found to have left its marks in people's minds and even physical appearances (Komlos and Kriwy, 2003) . Heinemann et al. (2009) show that individuals from the former GDR are more skeptical toward market-oriented reforms of the labor market than those socialized in the Western part of Germany. Furthermore, Alesina and Fuchs-Sch€ undeln (2007) find that, compared to their Western German countrymen, East Germans have a stronger preference for redistribution, which cannot fully be explained by their relatively low income. Motivated by the previous findings, we expect that socialization under Communism 11 implies a stronger preference for progressive taxation.
There are several reasons why older people might differ in their welfare preferences from younger individuals. First, the experience of different cohorts might differ substantially. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) find that the experience of sharp recessions during early adulthood affects redistributive preferences. In line with this, older individuals may remember the substantial social inequalities before the expansion of the welfare state since the 1970s (Heinemann, 2008; Lindbeck, 1995) . This socialization may make them see today's situation less critical and therefore perceive less necessity to redistribute. Second, uncertainty about the own economic and social status in life is larger for the young than for 11. Since we are interested in the effect of being socialized in the GDR and not in the respondents' current state of residence, our EAST dummy is equal to one for respondents born in the former GDR.
the old. Compared to the old, the perspective of young people with respect to their country's social situation is rather characterized by a thicker 'veil of ignorance' (Rawls, 1971) . As a consequence, the lower insecurity of the old may let them pay less attention to redistribution as an insurance for income risk. In addition, Sheffrin (1994) points to a possible status quo bias in the individual attitudes toward progressive taxation. Comparing British and US survey data, he finds a relatively higher preference for progressive taxation among the population in the United Kingdom and traces this back to the fact that the British taxes were more progressive than those in the United States when the surveys were conducted. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that the views of older individuals may be more biased in favor of the status quo than those of younger ones. Hence, the progressivity of the German income tax system might be reflected in a higher preference for increasing tax rates, especially among older people. The impact of a person's AGE on the tax rate preferences is, thus, a priori ambiguous. The literature reports that women have a stronger preference for income redistribution (e.g. Corneo and Gr€ uner 2002) . Therefore, FEMALES should also be more supportive of a highly redistributive taxation than males.
Furthermore, several variables related to the respondents' employment status are included in our empirical analysis. We would expect individuals who do not participate in the labor market (i.e. being either UNEMPLOYED or NOT EMPLOYED) and are, thus, dependent on public or private transfers to be more likely to support redistribution than those who are employed. This should also be the case for progressive taxation as these respondents should be, ceteris paribus, net recipients of this tax policy. 12 Other things equal, self-employed individuals are more prone to take (financial) risks and might also be more individualistic. Thus, we would expect that SELF-EMPLOYED are less supportive toward progressive taxation than employees.
Public employees are less likely to receive a high income than individuals employed in private enterprises. When it comes to pecuniary self-interest, we expect them to be in favor of a progressive tax system (relative to private economy employees). A further argument for diverging tax preferences between workers employed in the public and private sector is related to bureaucracy theories (e.g. Tullock, 1965) . In general, we would expect bureaucrats to have a distinct interest in taxes as they increase their budget and, thus, power. It is, however, a priori unclear which kind of tax structure public sector employees prefer. Given the German income tax legislation, the progressive tax structure is accompanied by several tax exemptions making a high number of public staff necessary. This should be favored by PUBLIC EMPLOYEES (Niskanen, 1971) . We therefore expect individuals employed in the public sector to be more likely to prefer a progressive tax scheme. Table A1 contains the descriptive statistics of the variables included in our econometric analysis. Furthermore, we report the correlation between the 12. The household composition may, however, matter as respondents who are not active in the labor market and, thus, dependent on intrahousehold transfers might be less likely to favor redistribution if this reduces the income of their household. This issue will be addressed in the robustness tests in section 4.2.
explanatory variables in Table A2 . It is worthwhile mentioning that the correlation between the explanatory variables is not particularly high indicating that the multicollinearity problem should not be very severe. Table 2 displays the main empirical results on the determinants of German voters' attitudes toward progressive taxation. We employ a probit approach since the dependent variable assumes the value of one for respondents choosing a (steeply) progressive taxation and a value of zero for those preferring proportional or regressive tax rates. The specification in the first column focuses on the individuals' financial self-interest. The second column includes proxies for the respondents' fairness preferences and beliefs. The variables capturing the respondents' fairness assessment are introduced in the specification shown in column 3. The final specification includes all categories of impact factors (column 4). The individual characteristics as well as the proxies for the respondents' level of information are controlled for in all specifications. There are basically two reasons for a gradual inclusion of the different categories of impact factors: first, this proceeding serves as a robustness check. Second, some of the impact factors are likely to be channels through which other included determinants affect the individual attitudes toward progressive taxation. In their empirical analysis of German survey data, Bischoff et al. (2013) show that the respondent's fairness perception of the status quo is shaped by fairness preferences, beliefs on the sources of economic success and the degree of procedural fairness as well as self-interest and several socioeconomic factors. Hence, it is meaningful to analyze the impact of the different categories of explanatory factors both separately and jointly to get valuable information on the net effects.
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

Main Results
The findings in Table 2 support the view that individual preferences for progressive taxation are driven by one's own redistributive gains and losses. While the experience of social mobility fails to be significant in all four regressions, the individuals' current position in the income distribution affects their attitudes toward tax progression. As expected, the support for progressive taxation is highest among individuals with a low income. The quantitative impact is also sizable: the probability to favor progressive taxes is, other things equal, 9-12 percentage points lower for middle-income recipients than for individuals who belong to the lowest income group. In addition, belonging to the 25% of the sample with the highest individual net income reduces the likelihood of supporting progression by 16-19 percentage points compared to low-income recipients.
Indicating that the attitudes toward different tax structures are not shaped solely by the impact of taxes on a person's own net income, an essential overall result is the relevance of fairness aspects. First, fairness preferences are found to be a significant determinant of individual tax preferences: the probability of supporting progressive taxation is almost 6 percentage points higher for individuals preferring a distribution according to the need principle than for those 
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Attitudes Toward Progressive Taxation entertaining different fairness preferences. Second, the respondents' economic beliefs are reflected in their views on tax policy. According to our estimates, persons attributing differences in social status to the interpersonal variation in effort show, ceteris paribus, a 10-12.5 percentage points lower probability of favoring tax rates that increase in income than those without this belief. The impact of the belief concerning the functioning of the democratic system is, however, less clear cut: controlling for the perceived fairness of the status quo, we find that the satisfaction with the effectiveness of the political system leads to a 5.4 percentage points higher probability of demanding a relatively higher taxation of wealthy persons (although only marginally significant). Little surprising, the assessed justice of the existing distributive situation is a relevant factor for the individual tax preference. Being content with the fairness of social differences tends to lower the probability of favoring tax progression by nearly 6 percentage points. However, the variable social differences loses significance if individual fairness preferences and beliefs are included. The perceived situation of ordinary people is significantly related to preferences for progressive taxation. Individuals who do not gauge a worsening of the situation of ordinary people show a 6-7.5 percentage points lower tendency to demand a disproportional higher taxation of high-income recipients. Finally, the satisfaction with the fairness of the own earnings leads to a significantly lower support for progressive taxes. The perceived justice of the own earnings has (with a marginal effect of approximately 10 percentage points) proven to be relevant for the formation of welfare state preferences.
While our proxies for the respondents' level of information do not contribute significantly to the explanation of tax attitudes, the respondents' age, being not employed and employment in the public sector are related to tax preferences. Both public employees and older people tend to be more likely to favor a progressive taxation, whereas persons who are not employed are less inclined to support this tax policy.
Robustness of the results
The empirical analysis suggests that the respondents' preferences for progressive taxation do not solely depend on egocentric financial self-interest. Beyond that, other factors such as fairness considerations enter the individual's optimizing calculus on the preferred degree of progressiveness. The subsequent section presents the results of several additional estimations that test the robustness of our general findings.
Ordered probit estimates
The first robustness test is motivated by the ordered structure of dependent variable. 13 The results of the ordered probit estimations are presented in Table 3 . The marginal effects are calculated for each of the three categories of the dependent variable and, thus, represent the impact of the explanatory variable on the probability that an individual chooses either of these categories (i.e. prefers a tax policy with rich people paying a higher, the same or a smaller share of their incomes in taxes). In general, the findings are widely unaffected by the choice of the ordered probit approach. One exception is the impact of information since both the perceived importance of politics and the education variables are now partly significant. Table 4 contains the results of additional estimates including further controls and provides further information on the impact of pecuniary interest. Instead of the respondents position within the income distribution, we capture the static financial self-interest by including binary variables referring to different net income categories. The estimates confirm that individuals with the lowest income tend to be most supportive to progressive taxation. As a further robustness check, we include additional individual control variables capturing the respondents' job status as blue-versus white-collar worker and his religiosity (i.e. membership in an institutionalized religious community). Our main results are not affected by the inclusion of these variables. While religiosity has no significant effect on individual attitudes toward progressive taxation, being a blue-collar worker increases the probability to prefer progressive tax rates by 11 percentage points.
Additional controls and specification of individual incomes
Differential impact of fairness consideration for different income groups
A key result of our empirical analysis is the relevance of fairness considerations in explaining German voters' attitudes toward progressive taxation. A possible interpretation of this finding may be that tax rate preferences do not only reflect a person's position in the income distribution but are also driven by fairness preferences, beliefs and the assessment of the current distribution. It is, however, possible that fairness considerations do not have an independent 13. The original survey question used to measure the attitudes toward progressive taxation contains five answer categories. For the ordered probit estimates we exploit a three-step scale by pooling the observations in the categories indicating that the rich should pay a smaller or much smaller share of their income in taxes as well as those related to a larger or much larger share. This is necessary because only 21 respondents state that they prefer a regressive taxation (i.e. a tax system where the rich should pay a smaller or much smaller share of their income in taxes than the poor). A separate analysis of all five categories included in the original question is, thus, not possible. 
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T. Hennighausen and F. Heinemann impact on tax policy preferences but are themselves a consequence of individual financial self-interests. This is indeed suggested by the psychological literature, which refers to a 'self-serving bias' (e.g. Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997) . This bias affects the perception and judgments since individuals tend to regard an advantageous (disadvantageous) outcome as fair (unfair). Hence, the effect of fairness preferences and assessments might be driven predominantly by lowincome respondents who benefit from a progressive taxation and, therefore, regard it as fair. Likewise, mostly high-income recipients might believe that effort matters for success.
As a first descriptive test of this argument's validity, we compare the mean values of the fairness variables for different income groups. The first three columns of Table 5 compare the respondents with the lowest individual net income (10th percentile) and the remaining sample. On average, low-income persons do not entertain significantly different fairness preferences, beliefs or assessments than the other respondents. In contrast to that, high-income persons (the 10% of the sample with the highest incomes) are, on average, significantly more inclined to believe that effort matters and to regard the social or their own situation as fair. In line with this, rich individuals do less often prefer the need principle. Although this exercise does indicate a self-serving bias, the question whether fairness motives have an uniform impact on individual preferences for tax progression over all income groups can only be answered based on multivariate regressions. Thus, we interact the respondents' income with their fairness preferences, assessments and beliefs to check whether fairness considerations affect tax policy preferences differently for high-and low-income individuals. 14 The results presented in Table 6 do not support this view since none of the interaction terms is significant. In specifications (1) to (5), a categorial variable indicating the individual monthly net income 15 is interacted with the fairness variables. The results suggest an overall strong income effect but only individual beliefs and the perception of an adequate payment remain significant after the inclusion of the interaction terms. Since the self-serving bias might be more evident among individuals with a very low or high income (as suggested by Table 5 ), we further Notes: Comparison of mean values of the variables NEED, EFFORT, SOCIAL DIFFERENCES, ORDINARY PEOPLE and ADEQUATE WAGE for different income groups. The assignment of individuals to different income groups is based on their individual net income. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%/ 5%/ 1% level.
14. The calculation of interaction effects in non-linear models requires some additional procedures because the marginal effect of an interaction term do not provide reliable information on its size or significance. Moreover, the interaction effect depends on the independent variables and is, hence, observation specific (Ai and Norton, 2003) . We calculate the interactions effects by applying the procedure proposed by Ai and Norton and report average values for the interaction effects and the standard errors. 15. This variable consists of ten income categories. Income À0.0233*** À0.0317*** À0.0192** À0.0275*** À0.0283*** 0.087 1.1229 0.0776 0.0979 0.0694 À0.1049** À0.1103 À0.1147* À0.1388** À0.1860*** 
Attitudes Toward Progressive Taxation Notes: Probit estimates (reported are average marginal effects). The calculation of reported average interaction effects and the corresponding average standard errors is based on Ai and Norton (2003) . *, **, *** denote significance at 10%/ 5%/ 1% level. The income used for the calculation of the interaction effects consist of ten categories indicating the respondents individual net income [NET INCOME, columns (1) to (5)] and dummy variables equal to one if the respondent belongs to the 10% with the lowest [LOW NET INCOME, columns (6) to (10)] or highest [HIGH NET INCOME, columns (11) to (15)] individual net income. Additional variables (data not shown) are those included in the benchmark specification (see Table 2 , column 4). The regressions are based on 827 observations. interact our fairness indicators with two binary variables equal to one for respondents belonging either to the 10% of the population with the lowest [specifications (6) to (10)] or those with the highest [specifications (11) to (15)] incomes. For these groups, fairness considerations have a stronger impact on preferences for tax progression though without a significant difference between income groups (i.e. the interaction effect is not significantly different from zero). Thus, fairness considerations have an independent impact on individual tax rate preferences and are not just an additional channel through which narrow redistributive self-interest drives attitudes toward progressive taxation.
Different income types and the incentives of the German tax system
In the preceding analysis, the individual's net income has been our proxy for the immediate financial self-interest. This variable may, however, not be able to fully capture the impact of taxation on one's own available net income.
The use of individual incomes, for instance, ignores that the respondent might live in a household and shares resources with other income recipients. Thus, a person who works only part time but lives in a high-income family may be treated as a low-income individual, although he actually belongs to the upper part of the income distribution. On the basis of this reasoning, we reestimated our baseline regressions using the respondent's equivalent (net) income 16 instead of his individual net income (see Table 7 ). Equivalent incomes have a weaker impact on the respondents' tax rate preferences than individual incomes. The variable is only marginally significant (and is insignificant if the respondent's fairness assessment is not included) and the size of the marginal effect is rather negligible. Part of the financial self-interest effect now seems to be captured by the respondents' social mobility since individuals who experienced upward mobility tend to be significantly less supportive toward progressive tax systems. The results remain widely robust with respect to the fairness-related proxies, only some individual characteristics (such as age, being not employed and employment in the public sector) lose significance. Moreover, one proxy for the respondents' level of information, the perceived importance of politics for their life, becomes at least partly significant.
As an additional robustness test, we include dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is married or has own children [see specification (5)]. However, neither the marital status nor the presence of children seems to be significantly related to individual attitudes toward progressive tax systems. This result is rather surprising since the German tax system allows a joint tax assessment for married individuals and, thus, treats tax payers differently depending 16. We calculated the equivalent income to adjust the household income for household size and to take economies of scale in household consumption into account. An intermediate equivalence scale is used and the equivalent household income equals the monthly net income of the household divided by the square root of the number of household members. The household income variable includes several unrealistically high-income observations (outliers). Thus, we have applied a top-coding procedure and replaced all incomes higher than ten times the median income by this value. 
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T. Hennighausen and F. Heinemann on their marital status. From the perspective of a person who is legally married, 17 the individual income may not capture his self-interest regarding tax progression because the tax payments are determined by the income of both spouses. A lowincome earner, for instance, might not benefit from a progressive taxation if his spouse has a well paid job. What is essential, however, is that the inclusion of these dummy variables does not change the key results for the fairness-related indicators. The analysis presented in Table 8 addresses this issue by dividing the sample based on the respondents' marital status and analyzing the determinants of tax progression preferences separately for legally married and non-married individuals. The results have to be regarded with caution due to the considerable reduction in observations as a consequence of the sample split. They indicate that for married persons the individual income is significantly related to their attitudes toward progressive taxation. Furthermore, the magnitude and significance of the income effect are not affected by the inclusion of variables, which proxy the income potential of the respondents' partner. Attitudes toward a progressive tax system do not differ between individuals whose partner is employed (either full or part time) and those without a working spouse irrespective of the individual income.
The comparison of the empirical results for the two samples reveals further insights on differences in attitudes toward taxation between married and non-married individuals. While preferences for the need principle and the assessed situation of ordinary people contribute significantly to the explanation of tax progression preferences among non-married individuals, they do not explain these attitudes among married persons. Beyond that also the effects of effort and the perceived fairness of social differences and of own wages differ between both samples.
Although fairness considerations seem to matter for both groups of respondents, the concrete effects of fairness aspects (as well as self-interest) on individual attitudes toward progressive taxation might depend strongly on the group of individuals considered and their life situation. Our main results presented in Table 2 should, hence, be interpreted as an average effect for a sample of German voters but must not apply to each single individual or group of individuals. Although we cannot rule out that omitted variables may drive individual financial self-interest, fairness considerations, level of information and individual characteristics as well as attitudes toward progressive taxation, this analysis points at the relevance of both fairness aspects and narrow redistributive selfinterest in determining preferences for different tax schemes.
CONCLUSION
Political-economic approaches explaining the size of the welfare state are usually based on the assumption that individuals solely apply the criterion of their own redistributive gain or loss when they reflect on the preferred system. Thus, an individual's demand for redistribution should largely result from his position in the income distribution. Our findings, however, indicate that an analysis of individual tax preferences that focuses solely on this narrow financial calculus leaves out an important part of the story. Individuals with other regarding preferences do not necessarily choose the tax system that is most beneficial to their own material advantage but also care about its fairness. Consequently, even highincome individuals may support a tax system where they have to pay a larger share of their income in taxes than low-income earners. Especially the fairness preferences, the beliefs on the reasons for inequality and the perceived justice of the status quo distribution contribute to the explanation of individual heterogeneity in attitudes toward progressive taxation. Our findings are highly relevant when it comes to the actual implementation of tax reforms. To foster voter support for potentially growth-enhancing tax policies (via a lower degree of tax progression), it is important to also address the fairness-related concerns about such a reform. Focusing on fairness aspects seems to be an essential issue for a successful selling of reforms. Especially, the perception of decreasing social justice determines the voters' preference for a progressive taxation. Since high marginal tax rates may lower individual work incentives, they can result in a higher injustice of the income distribution. To overcome this potential vicious circle, politicians could, for example, stress the relevance of industriousness for economic success as well as the impact of incentives for individual effort. Given our results, the belief that someone has responsibility for his own economic situation would also increase the voters' support for tax reforms which aim at reducing disincentives that result from marginal tax rates increasing in income. 
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